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A  growing  number  of  studies  indicate  that aspects  of psychology  and  cognition  inﬂuence  network  struc-
ture,  but  much  remains  to  be  learned  about  how  network  information  is  stored  and  retrieved  fromxperiment
ocial brain hypothesis
RGM
memory.  Are  networks  recalled  as  dyads,  as triads,  or  more  generally  as  sub-groups?  We  employ  an
experimental  design  coupled  with  exponential  random  graph  models  to address  this  issue.  We  ﬁnd  that
respondents  ﬂexibly  encode  social  information  as  triads  or groups,  depending  on the  network,  but  not
as  dyads.  This  supports  prior  research  showing  that  networks  are  stored  using  “compression  heuristics”,
but also provides  evidence  of  cognitive  ﬂexibility  in the  process  of  encoding  relational  information.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
How are social networks encoded into human memory?
umerous studies using both human and animal models have
emonstrated a connection between physical brain structure and
ocial networks (Bickart et al., 2011; Dunbar, 1992, 1993, 1995;
oncalves et al., 2011; Meyer et al., 2012; Sallet et al., 2011;
tiller and Dunbar, 2007; Zahn et al., 2007). Other research has
hown links between social network structure and personality
raits (Burt et al., 1998; Casciaro, 1998; Clifton et al., 2009; Kalish
nd Robins, 2006; Klein et al., 2004; Mehra et al., 2001; Totterdell
t al., 2008), cognitive development in childhood (Leinhardt, 1973;
chaefer et al., 2010), and strong predispositions towards spe-
iﬁc network types (Daniel et al., 2013; Hallinan and Kubitschek,
988). Moreover, research indicates that perceptions and mental
epresentations of networks often vary with one’s position in the
raph or sense of power (Krackhardt, 1987, 1990; Kumbasar et al.,
994; Simpson and Borch, 2005; Simpson et al., 2011), and that
umans use schemata to simplify the recall of networks (Brashears,
013; Brewer and Garrett, 2001; Brewer and Yang, 1994; De Soto,
960; Freeman, 1992; Freeman et al., 1987; Killworth and Bernard,
982). In general, this body of research indicates that cognition
s an essential, even primary, factor in explaining interpersonal
 This research was  partially supported by a grant from the USA National Science
oundation (Award #1059282).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 607 255 4925.
E-mail address: meb299@cornell.edu (M.E. Brashears).
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378-8733/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article unlicense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
networks (e.g., DiMaggio, 1997). Nevertheless, despite an earlier
stream of research (e.g., Brewer, 1995, 2000; Brewer and Webster,
1999; Brewer and Yang, 1994; Hlebec and Ferligoj, 2001; Killworth
and Bernard, 1982), we  know relatively little about a critical aspect
of network cognition: how are social networks encoded and rep-
resented in memory? Do humans remember the individual dyads
that comprise a social network, small microstructures (e.g., triads),
or do they somehow encode the entire structure as a simpliﬁed
whole (e.g., clusters)?
This is a particularly troubling oversight because of its deep
connections to the origins of social network structure. Much of the
overall structure of social networks can be attributed to dyadic (e.g.,
Faust, 2007), availability (e.g., Blau, 1977; Mayhew and Levinger,
1976a), and foci (Feld, 1981) effects. Nevertheless, individual
agency remains essential to many explanations of the origins
of network structure and network dynamics (e.g., Granovetter,
1973; Burt, 1992; Heider, 1946). Individuals make choices about
alters (e.g., to form a tie with a similar other) and network micro-
structures (e.g., to close a triad rather than leave it open) based on
their preferences, and also use networks as exogenous opportunity
structures (Burt, 1992), taking advantage of an opportunity or
transferring information (e.g., Burt et al., 1998; Ibarra, 1992).
Because individual, preference-driven decisions will be based not
on the actual state of the network, but on the perceived state of the
network (e.g., Kilduff and Krackhardt, 2008: Ch. 3), the manner in
which social networks are encoded and represented in memory
can have a profound impact on the ultimate structure of a network
and the behavior of network members. However, while research
has considered motivational predictors of network structure (e.g.,
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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ehra et al., 2001; Totterdell et al., 2008), correlates of recall for
etwork members (e.g., Killworth et al., 2003; Marin, 2004) and
ircumstances that improve or degrade network perception (e.g.,
rackhardt, 1987, 1990; Simpson and Borch, 2005; Simpson et al.,
011), we know considerably less about how social networks are
ognitively stored and manipulated. Our understanding of the
ocial environment fundamentally constrains the choices we  make
e.g., form or eliminate a tie), and we cannot act to produce, or
void, a social situation that we cannot perceive (e.g., developing
 friendship with a person central in a conﬂict network, or asking
or advice from a low status individual). Therefore, if we  are to
nderstand why individuals prefer certain conﬁgurations of ties,
e must ﬁrst understand how networks are made cognitively
vailable for preferences to act upon.
We address this puzzle by using an innovative experiment
mploying human subjects in combination with sophisticated
xponential random graph models to determine how individ-
als mentally store social network information. Our results, based
n data collected from three hundred individuals, indicate that
umans encode relationships primarily in terms of triads, but can
lso use group-based methods, depending on the information avail-
ble in the network. In contrast, individuals do not appear to encode
elationships as dyads. These results are important for two rea-
ons. First, they reafﬁrm that humans have a preferred approach
o encoding networks: as triads. We  argue that the use of triads
ather than dyads in memory encoding reﬂects a tradeoff between
ognitive economy, reducing the demands on the organism by
emembering clusters of ties, while still permitting an individ-
al to encode cleavages within a group, which may have been
ssential to the evolution of human intelligence (Humphrey, 1976;
ilk, 2007). Moreover, triads appear essential to social processes
cross a variety of non-human social species (Chase et al., 2002;
heney and Seyfarth, 2008; Cheney et al., 1986; Paz-y-Min˜o-C et al.,
004), implying that they are a key aspect of sociality generally.
ncoding relational information as triads may  also partially explain
he prevalence of triadic structures in empirical data collected
sing respondent recall. Second, our results also show that our
espondents displayed cognitive ﬂexibility, changing their encod-
ng strategy based on the information available in the network. This
s important because the type of bias expected when recalling net-
ork information, and therefore when taking action, depends on
he information available to individuals about the structure of the
etwork.
We begin by describing the research linking cognition and net-
ork structure and deriving our hypotheses. We  then introduce our
nique research design, which allows us to analyze an aggregate of
hree hundred experimentally derived social networks using expo-
ential random graph models. We  present our results, discuss their
mplications, and conclude by suggesting additional key directions
or future research.
. Background
.1. Theories of network structure
Social networks are valuable for many tasks, including locating
nd obtaining jobs (e.g., Bewley, 1999; Granovetter, 1973, 1995;
arsden and Gorman, 2001; McDonald, 2011; McDonald et al.,
009), attaining status (e.g., Son and Lin, 2012), and acquiring
eeded household services (e.g., Wellman and Wortley, 1990). As
 result, it is hardly surprising that considerable effort has been
xpended to understand the mechanisms that give rise to partic-
lar network structures. This effort has generally focused on two
esearch streams: structural accounts and agency-based accounts.
he ﬁrst stream holds that network structure is largely shaped byNetworks 41 (2015) 113–126
the overall availability of others for association (e.g., Blau, 1977;
Mayhew and Levinger, 1976a), their presence within voluntary
associations (e.g., McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1982, 1987) and
the inﬂuence of foci (Feld, 1981). In combination, these processes
help explain the prevalence of homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton,
1954; McPherson et al., 2001), or a tendency to associate with those
like oneself; because mainly persons with similar characteristics
are available in the environment, networks tend to be dominated
by connections between similar individuals. Network structures
above the dyad, such as triads, have also been partially explained
using the distribution of dyads (Faust, 2007), suggesting that struc-
ture in general is constrained by the distribution of dyads in the
graph.
The second stream of research relies on the concept of agency:
individuals come to occupy particular network structures because
of their own  (in)actions. These agentic accounts can be broadly cat-
egorized by their favored mode of action: differences in preferences
or differences in perceptions. In the former, individuals occupy dif-
ferent network structures because they prefer those structures.
Early research in this vein attempted to explain variation in male
and female networks (e.g., Marsden, 1987) using alleged differences
in disposition (Lincoln and Miller, 1979), although this account has
not gone uncontested (e.g., Moore, 1990). Other research has found
that individuals tend to direct ties to more powerful alters (e.g.,
Brashears, 2008; Ibarra, 1992), indicating that networks are inﬂu-
enced by the strategic preferences of their members. Research also
suggests that personality traits inﬂuence the motivation of indi-
viduals to pursue speciﬁc network conﬁgurations (e.g., Burt et al.,
1998; Kalish and Robins, 2006; Klein et al., 2004; Mehra et al., 2001;
Totterdell et al., 2008) or their inclination to perform well in speciﬁc
network roles (e.g., Emery, 2012).
Alternatively, network structure is sometimes attributed to dif-
ferences in individual perception or understanding of networks.
Classic research in this stream has found that more central persons
in a network tend to have more accurate perceptions of its struc-
ture (Krackhardt, 1987, 1990; Kumbasar et al., 1994), while later
research has concluded that low power actors have more accu-
rate perceptions (e.g., Simpson and Borch, 2005; Simpson et al.,
2011). Other researchers have presented evidence that a number
of personality traits are related to accurate network perceptions,
including extraversion and self-monitoring (Casciaro, 1998). In all
of these cases, individuals are thought to make different choices
because they have divergent understandings of the network itself.
Both structural and agentic explanations of network structure
ﬁll vital roles, but both have limitations. Structural accounts show
how our choice of associates is fundamentally limited by circum-
stance, but are generally less effective in predicting which choice
is made. Put differently, if our pool of possible associates is likened
to the menu in a restaurant, structural accounts are very good at
predicting which menu is selected from, but are relatively poor at
predicting which dish is ultimately chosen. Agentic explanations
show how individuals choose from among their options, but are
less effective in explaining which individuals become available for
association in the ﬁrst place.
Agentic explanations suffer from an additional signiﬁcant,
and understudied, drawback: a lack of understanding about
how social information is cognitively processed and represented.
Preference-based accounts essentially ignore this issue, assum-
ing that individuals are equally, and perfectly, accurate in their
understanding of a network. Perception-based accounts in con-
trast recognize that individuals may  vary in their understandings,
and have begun to show which factors increase or decrease accu-
racy, but remain agnostic about how such information is processed
and represented in the ﬁrst place. Much of the existing work on
this issue has focused on the elicitation of names (e.g., Brewer
and Garrett, 2001; Killworth and Bernard, 1982; Marin, 2004) or
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umbers of alters who meet certain criteria (e.g., Killworth et al.,
003), rather than the recall of structures, and thus provides only
eak guidance. The manner in which networks are processed and
tored will inﬂuence which structural features individuals become
ware of, and thus will impact both what perceptions are possi-
le as well as the raw material on which preferences can operate.
n essence, the manner in which an individual cognitively stores
etworks is itself a type of structural constraint (e.g., Bernard and
illworth, 1973; Mayhew and Levinger, 1976b). By understanding
hese cognitive constraints, we can better understand the types of
tructures that humans can cognitively represent, thereby bridging
he gap between structural and agentic accounts.
For example, research by Bearman et al. (2004) found that the
dolescent sexual network in an American high school formed a
spanning tree” structure, or a network with a large connected com-
onent, low clustering and long average path lengths. Given the size
f the network (800 nodes), it seems obvious that the students did
ot construct such a structure deliberately. Instead, Bearman et al.
rgued that the spanning tree emerged from individual adherence
o a rule: do not have sex with the former sexual partner of your
ormer sexual partner’s current sexual partner. One obvious impli-
ation is that if the rule used by the adolescents had been different,
hen the overall network also would have been different. A less
bvious implication is that because adherence to a rule requires
he ability to recognize when the rule is violated, human networks
ill be structured by the cognitive abilities of their members. If
ndividuals cannot recognize when a rule is and is not violated,
hen the rule cannot guide individual behavior. Hence, the speciﬁc
anner in which each individual stores network information will
irectly inﬂuence what rules are available for use by constraining
hat network features are and are not recognized. Because, whole
etwork structures (such as a spanning tree) are too complex to be
ognitively represented in any detail, the choice of individuals was
nstead focused on smaller, cognitively accessible structures that
ggregated into a spanning tree.
Human cognition likely detects and stores some features over
thers, and these features both inﬂuence individual perceptions,
nd form the basis for choices meant to achieve desired outcomes.
hus, in order to explain social network structure as an aggrega-
ion of actors’ local network decisions, it is necessary to understand
he cognitive processing of network information that guides and
onstrains these network decisions.
.2. Cognition and social network structure
The importance of cognition for social networks has long been
ecognized, although the speciﬁcs of how social information is
epresented in the brain remain largely unknown. A substantial
mount of this interest stems from the Machiavellian Intelligence
r “social brain” hypothesis, proposed by Humphrey (1976), which
rgues that human intelligence evolved to cope with the social,
ather than the physical, environment (for an excellent review see
heney and Seyfarth, 2008: Ch. 7). Subsequent research has shown
hat brain structure in general, and the cross-primate ratio of neo-
ortical volume to the remaining brain in particular, is associated
ith network size (Barton, 1996; Bickart et al., 2011; Dunbar, 1992,
993, 1995; Goncalves et al., 2011; Kudo and Dunbar, 2001; Meyer
t al., 2012; Sallet et al., 2011; Stiller and Dunbar, 2007; Zahn et al.,
007). Human social networks have been shown to be strikingly
imilar to non-human networks, at least for positive relations, sug-
esting that cognitive mechanisms supporting sociality are shared
y many species (Faust and Skvoretz, 2002; Skvoretz and Faust,
002). Other research indicates that social abilities increase during
arly childhood as individuals learn both to model the intentions
f others (Karniol and Ross, 1979), and to manage triadic relations
Hallinan and Kubitschek, 1988; Leinhardt, 1973; Schaefer et al.,Networks 41 (2015) 113–126 115
2010, but see also Daniel et al., 2013), thereby suggesting that
social networks depend on the maturation of critical brain regions.
However, while this research indicates that the brain is integral
to social networks, it does not explain how it manages a complex
and shifting mass of information about social networks. In other
words, we  know that the brain carries out operations that are nec-
essary to social networks, but we do not know precisely what those
operations are.
The basis for any investigation of the cognitive representation
of social information is an understanding of how networks are
stored in memory. Memory is generally deﬁned as the ability to
store and retrieve information unaided and processing can only
occur on information that can be made available (i.e., held in the
mind) in the ﬁrst place. Obviously, one’s ability to develop and
maintain relationships with others depends at a basic level on the
ability to remember those others and their past behavior, and mem-
ory has thus become a standard element in models of cooperation
and defection (e.g., Macy, 1995; Welser et al., 2007). Research has
additionally shown (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley, 1986)
that memory can be sub-divided into several distinct types that
are linked to speciﬁc regions in the brain. For example, episodic
memory (i.e., memory for speciﬁc events) depends upon the medial
temporal lobe while semantic memory (i.e., facts about the world
or general knowledge) relies upon the lateral and inferior temporal
cortex (Garrad and Hodges, 1999). The amygdala has been linked to
the formation of conditioned fear associations (LeBar et al., 1995;
LeDoux, 1996), while the basal ganglia appear to be involved in
developing positive associations (Bartels and Zeki, 2000). An addi-
tional critical distinction can be made between long-term memory,
or memory for events that happened more than a few moments ago,
and working memory, or memory for items on which the mind is
currently focusing. The diversity of memory systems, functions, and
locations serves as a useful reminder that different tasks recruit dif-
ferent portions of the brain, and thus research on memory for facts
or experiences may  be of limited use to understanding the recall
of social networks. Much of the existing research devoted to issues
of network recall has been concerned with the accuracy of survey
data rather than with mental representations of networks (e.g., Bell
et al., 2007; Brewer, 2000; Brewer and Garrett, 2001; Brewer and
Webster, 1999; Hlebec and Ferligoj, 2001; Killworth et al., 2003;
Marin, 2004). Nevertheless, there does exist some research in this
area.
One early stream of work challenged the notion that human
network recall is reliable at all, ﬁnding that recollections of inter-
action failed to reproduce observed behavior at dyadic (Bernard
and Killworth, 1977), triadic (Killworth and Bernard, 1979/1980),
or clique (Bernard et al., 1979/1980) levels. This led to the disturbing
conclusion that memory for interaction is so poor that self-report
network data are entirely unreliable. However, later studies found
that patterns of interaction could be inferred from perceptions
(e.g., Romney and Faust, 1982), although there was  not a simple
correspondence between what was  recalled and what occurred.
Additional research (Freeman and Romney, 1987; Freeman et al.,
1987) showed that individual recall tended to be an inaccurate indi-
cator of any speciﬁc encounter (e.g., attendance at a colloquium
talk), but a reliable measure of typical patterns of behavior (e.g.,
typical attendance at colloquia). Moreover, human recall for sub-
groups in a social community has been shown to match well with
observed patterns of association (Freeman et al., 1988, 1989). As
such, while errors in recall are certainly present, it appears that
humans are strikingly accurate at recalling the regular patterns of
interaction that form social structure.De Soto (1960) performed some of the earliest work on network
structures and cognition using a paired-associates learning experi-
ment, ﬁnding that structural conﬁgurations are learned faster when
they are built from the appropriate type of relation. For example,
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ierarchical structures are learned more quickly when composed
f “inﬂuences” relations rather than “is friends with”. De Soto inter-
reted this to mean that subjects possessed schemata (1960: 420),
r pre-existing frameworks for understanding information, that
llowed them to organize the learning experience and complete
t more rapidly (Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1967). Schemata have been
hown to be integral to memory for many types of information (e.g.,
rewer and Treyens, 1981; Martin, 1993), and thus it is no sur-
rise to ﬁnd that they are important for social knowledge as well.
ater researchers have conﬁrmed the importance of schemata gen-
rally, and schemas pertaining to affective balance (Cartright and
arary, 1956) in particular (e.g., Picek et al., 1975; Fischer, 1968;
entis and Burnstein, 1979; Walker, 1976; but see also Welch-Ross
nd Schmidt, 1996). Schemas derived from geographic location
Brewer and Garrett, 2001; Killworth and Bernard, 1982), context
e.g., Brewer and Garrett, 2001), kinship (e.g., Brewer and Yang,
994) and typical behavior (e.g., Freeman et al., 1987) have also
een found to inﬂuence the recall of social networks.
More recent research (Freeman, 1992) shows that individuals
end to misremember small networks in ways that are consis-
ent with a schema and that respondents mentally divide alters
nto mutually exclusive, rather than overlapping, groups. Similarly,
anicik and Larrick (2005) found that those with more missing
elations in their personal social networks learned incomplete
etworks more rapidly, that the skill is speciﬁcally social and not
 consequence of general pattern recognition ability, that prior
ractice with incomplete triads enhances learning speed, and that
ndividuals who learn incomplete networks faster also appear to
ake better strategic coalition choices. The uniqueness of social
etwork recall as a cognitive function has also been conﬁrmed by
ater research (Simpson et al., 2011). Finally, research by Stiller and
unbar (2007) indicates that network size and structure are posi-
ively related to individual memory capacity and intentionality (i.e.,
heory of mind).
The above research is important, but suffers from a number
f limitations. Much of the existing research (e.g., Bernard and
illworth, 1977; Bernard et al., 1979/1980; Brewer and Yang, 1994;
illworth and Bernard, 1979/1980; Freeman et al., 1988, 1989;
reeman and Romney, 1987; Freeman et al., 1987) has measured
xisting, natural networks. This has obvious advantages for external
alidity, but raises serious difﬁculties since any particular series of
bserved interactions or set of recollections reﬂects a sample drawn
rom the underlying social structure (e.g., Freeman and Romney,
987). Unless memory is perfect, those ties that are recalled are
 subset of all ties that an individual participates in. Similarly, any
articular set of interactions observed in a speciﬁc series of encoun-
ers (e.g., parties, colloquia, etc.) represent the activation of only a
ubset of the ties connecting individuals together. Thus, both recall
f naturally occurring networks and observation of interaction
n speciﬁc settings provide estimates of the true social structure,
ather than a complete elucidation of that structure. Comparisons
re further complicated by the presence of outliers, as well as differ-
nces in the distributions between recalled and observed networks
e.g., Romney and Faust, 1982). Respondents also differ in their
hresholds for including ties in data collection (e.g., Feld and Carter,
002), and vary in the quality of their recall based on their structural
ocation (Krackhardt, 1987, 1990; Kumbasar et al., 1994), level of
ower (Simpson and Borch, 2005; Simpson et al., 2011) and degree
f involvement in the community (Freeman et al., 1987). As a result,
t is exceedingly difﬁcult, though not impossible, to obtain reliable
easures of recall accuracy using naturally occurring networks.
The remaining research has generally adopted an experimentalesign (e.g., De Soto, 1960; Fischer, 1968; Janicik and Larrick, 2005;
icek et al., 1975; Sentis and Burnstein, 1979; Simpson et al., 2011),
hich allows the researcher to know the “true” structure of the
etwork perfectly. Unfortunately, and with few exceptions (e.g.,Networks 41 (2015) 113–126
Simpson et al., 2011), these experiments have examined learning
speed, rather than overall capacity, and have relied on small four-
person networks. The former issue makes it difﬁcult to link this
experimental work to natural studies of network recall, while the
latter represents a network of such trivial size that it is unlikely to
challenge a respondent, and therefore will not reveal the limits of
recall.
Recent research by Brashears (2013) avoids these issues by using
15-person target networks to show that schemata also function as
“compression heuristics,” allowing social information to be stored
in a reduced form. As a result, larger numbers of relations can
be recalled more accurately when the networks adhere to certain
patterns than when they do not. He also found, consistent with ear-
lier research (e.g., Freeman, 1992), that respondents exhibited an
increased tendency to incorrectly close triads when primed with
a schema suggesting triadic closure, and were less prone to this
error otherwise. These results indicate that perception of social
networks is not a relatively passive process of observation, but
instead requires the active use of compression heuristics to orga-
nize and encode information into memory. Moreover, the heuristics
that are used will systematically bias respondents in favor of cer-
tain types of mistakes, and thus induce consistent changes in their
perceptions of social networks.
The overall conclusion that must be drawn from the preceding
research is that memory serves as the foundation for the mecha-
nisms that permit human sociability. However, while the existing
research demonstrates that memory is important, that schemata
and compression heuristics are critical, and that recall is an active
process, it does not show the form in which networks are stored in
memory. It is to this issue that we  now turn.
3. Theory and hypotheses
Based on prior research it is clear that humans use schemata to
simplify and compress the information contained in a network for
easier, more efﬁcient storage. But what features of a social network
are actually encoded in memory? The selection of features for recall
is likely shaped by two forces: the need for accuracy and the need
for economy.
Memory for social relationships must be accurate if it is to be
useful. Numerous prior studies suggest that events occurring in one
relationship are often constrained by the presence of other rela-
tionships; an individual is often more reluctant to cheat or harm
an alter if they have associates in common who  can apply sanc-
tions (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). High quality memory
for relationships is thus essential both to detecting others who can
be taken advantage of, and to ascertaining whether one is relatively
safe from being victimized in turn. Moreover, even small numbers
of ties can have a substantial impact on the overall connectivity
and performance of a network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Watts,
1999), suggesting that failure to recall even one tie out of many
could radically change individual perception of the network, lead-
ing to sub-optimal decisions. If the social brain hypothesis (e.g.,
Humphrey, 1976) is correct, individuals who out-perform their
associates on social tasks should generally obtain more rewards
and reproduce more successfully, suggesting that human memory
for social networks should be structured to ensure high accuracy.
Existing research shows that complex network structures are often
constrained by their dyad distributions (Faust, 2007), suggesting
that recall of dyads provides a relatively large amount of informa-
tion on overall network structure. Additionally, ties are known to
vary in strength (Granovetter, 1973) based on the unique invest-
ment of time, mutual conﬁding, affect, and reciprocal services that
characterize the tie. Different types of ties are used for different
kinds of functions (e.g., Wellman and Wortley, 1990) and one of
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triads), and the dominance hierarchies of Pinyon jays rely on sim-
ilar triadic processes (Paz-y-Min˜o-C et al., 2004). It thus appears
that triad-based recall would both provide greater efﬁciency thanM.E. Brashears, E. Quintane / S
he strongest types of relationships, a committed romantic rela-
ionship, is also one of the richest sources of support (Wellman
nd Wellman, 1992). Similar kinds of pair-bonded relationships are
lso of critical importance to non-human primates (e.g., Cheney
nd Seyfarth, 2008; Cheney et al., 1986), particularly in avoiding
nfanticide. Taken together, this suggests that dyads possess unique
eatures that grant them different capabilities to perform useful
ork, and that these differences have likely been present to some
xtent for a considerable period of evolutionary time. This sug-
ests that human memory should be geared to remembering dyads
s individual units so as to afford maximum detail, constituting a
ottom-up representation of social structure, and leading to the
ollowing hypothesis:
Dyadic Recall Hypothesis: Networks are preferentially recalled
in human memory in terms of individual dyads.
While accuracy of recall is indisputably important, it is nev-
rtheless the case that cognition imposes costs on an organism.
irst, while the brain accounts for only two percent of adult body
ass it consumes roughly 20 percent of the body’s metabolic
nergy (Dunbar, 1992); thus increasing brain activity or mass in
rder to accommodate greater social capability will rapidly lead to
iminishing returns. Second, human memory systems have ﬁnite
apacity. While an unknown and apparently very large amount of
ata can be maintained in long-term memory, working memory,
hen measured using digit span (e.g., Halford et al., 1994) or word
pan (e.g., Radvansky and Copeland, 2004) exercises, has been esti-
ated as having the capacity for four to seven discrete pieces of
nformation (Reisberg, 1997). Because working memory contains
he information used to inform decisions, individuals will have dif-
culty recognizing or manipulating structures that are too large
o ﬁt in working memory, even if they can store all of the infor-
ation to build such structures in long-term memory. If networks
re encoded as individual dyads, this implies that humans cannot
old in memory, and therefore reason about, networks composed
f more than four to seven dyads. While the accuracy of dyadic-
ncoding is desirable, it may  also be too expensive to be practical.
s an alternative, humans may  tend to encode social information
rimarily in terms of in-groups and out-groups, greatly simplify-
ng problems of recall. Balance theory (Cartright and Harary, 1956),
ith its prediction that social systems will develop into pairs of
utually exclusive groups, is consistent with this notion. Indeed,
hen balance is perfect one’s own feelings towards third parties
re the same as the feelings of one’s associates (e.g., I like all of
he same people that my  friends like). Thus, instead of keeping
rack of their sentiments individually (i.e., n(n−1) − (n−1) distinct
elations) it is only necessary to keep track of one’s own  views
i.e., n−1 distinct relations), as these contain the same information.
he pleasing nature of balanced relations may  thus stem from the
omparative ease with which they can be recalled and cognitively
epresented (see also Kilduff and Krackhardt, 2008: Ch. 4). Like-
ise, Freeman’s (1992) ﬁnding that subjects tend to divide alters
nto non-overlapping groups suggests that the root structure of cog-
itive recall is the group, with elaborations added to account for
xceptions or particularly important relations. Additional studies
e.g., Freeman et al., 1987, 1988, 1989) ﬁnd that humans are quite
ood at remembering individual membership in subgroups, and
hat recall of group members often follows chains of social prox-
mity, and thus tends to elicit group members as part of their local
ub-structure (Brewer, 1995; Brewer et al., 2005; Brewer and Yang,
994). This is consistent with the encoding of networks in terms of
roup membership, and constitutes a top-down representation of
ocial structure, leading to the following hypothesis:Networks 41 (2015) 113–126 117
• Group Recall Hypothesis: Networks are preferentially recalled
in human memory in terms of group membership.
Finally, while the limits of working memory are a serious con-
cern, strategies for circumventing these limits, such as “chunking”
(Miller, 1956; Postman, 1975), have already been identiﬁed. For
example, phone numbers are often remembered as two  sets of three
numbers and one set of four numbers, rather than as a string of
ten individual digits. The amount of information is the same (i.e.,
10 digits), but it is repackaged into a familiar form (i.e., a familiar
schema) that is easier to retain in memory. Similarly, if an orga-
nizing principle (i.e., schema) can be identiﬁed in material to be
recalled the raw information can be discarded in favor of the rule.
For example a number sequence that increases by two each time
(e.g., 2, 4, 6, 8, etc.) is much easier to remember than an equiva-
lent sequence with no apparent organizing principle (e.g., 2, 9, 4, 7,
etc.).1
In social terms, relations might be recalled not as individual
dyads, but as larger “chunked” sub-structures. While these sub-
structures abstract from the individual relations, and therefore
provide less detail (and likely less accuracy) than dyad-based recall,
they also provide more room for the recollection of within-group
differences and disagreements than does group-based recall. While
a graph can be broken down into its individual edges, in social
networks the presence or absence of one edge depends intimately
on the presence or absence of others. The interdependence of dyads
is the foundation for Granovetter’s “forbidden triad” (Granovetter,
1973) and the motivation for specialized network methods, such
as MR/QAP (e.g., Hubert, 1985; Krackhardt, 1988) and Exponential
Random Graph Models (e.g., Lusher et al., 2013). These depend-
encies can reﬂect key alliances or bitter rivalries between group
members that can dramatically alter the social landscape for the
individual and must not be ignored. Cognitively, encoding networks
as dyads might tend to obscure these dependencies by forcing the
individual to, in a sense, manually add other relevant dyads into
memory.2 In contrast, encoding networks as sub-structures allows
these dependencies to be included automatically when the rele-
vant dyads are brought into memory, and thus should confer an
advantage. The social brain hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten, 2002;
Humphrey, 1976) suggests that this improved detail should provide
an advantage over group-based recall by permitting individuals to
recognize and exploit within-group cleavages.
An obvious candidate for such a “chunked” structure is the triad.
While there are 64 possible triadic conﬁgurations containing asym-
metric ties, they reduce to a mere 16 isomorphism classes (Davis
and Leinhardt, 1972; Holland and Leinhardt, 1970), representing
a manageable schema for recall. Moreover, the triad has emerged
repeatedly in research on human social networks (e.g., Burt, 1992;
Granovetter, 1973; Skvoretz et al., 1996), pointing to its substan-
tive utility. Among non-humans, primates have been shown to
use knowledge of the relationships between others to shape their
responses to social situations (Cheney and Seyfarth, 2008; Cheney
et al., 1986), indicating that social behavior is conditioned on tri-
adic sub-structures. This is particularly striking because primates
exhibit considerably greater skill at making triadic inferences in
social domains than in non-social domains (ibid). Likewise, Chase
et al. (2002) have shown that linear dominance hierarchies among
cichlid ﬁsh tend not to emerge without third-party observation (i.e.,1 See Cheney and Seyfarth (2008)Cheney and Seyfarth (2008: 117) for additional
discussion of this issue and a strikingly similar example.
2 We do not mean to suggest that the individual would be aware of this process.
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yad-based recall and is a better format for capturing critical social
rocesses that unfold in many species, including humans. This con-
titutes a middle-out representation of social structure, and leads
o the following hypothesis:
Triad Recall Hypothesis: Networks are preferentially recalled in
human memory in terms of triads.
In summary, human network recall is likely shaped by the ben-
ﬁts of accuracy and the necessity of economy. If accuracy is most
avored, recall should be based on dyads. If economy is favored,
ecall should be based on groups. If these forces are in balance,
ecall should be based on efﬁcient triads. And existing research pro-
ides reason to think that networks might be encoded at the dyadic,
roup, or triadic levels. Below we describe our data and the ana-
ytic method we employ to distinguish between these bottom-up,
op-down, and middle-out models of human network memory.
. Methods
.1. Data
We  reanalyze the data described in Brashears’ (2013) study of
chemata as compression heuristics. These data were gathered
n controlled, experimental conditions and asked respondents to
emorize and recall a novel network of 15 people, with the target
etworks varying either in their structure or in the type of labels
sed to describe the relationships. These data have several advan-
ages. First, respondents are asked to recall a novel social network
ather than a network in which they are actually embedded. Since
emory is substantially aided by opportunities for rehearsal,
ariation in frequency of contact with alters in naturally occurring
etworks could produce inaccurate estimates of recall accuracy
e.g., Freeman et al., 1987). Second, because the target networks are
rovided by the experimenter, recall accuracy can be determined
erfectly rather than inferred from either aggregated individual
esponses (e.g., Krackhardt, 1987, 1990) or observed behavior (e.g.,
ernard and Killworth, 1977; Bernard et al., 1979/1980; Killworth
nd Bernard, 1979/1980), both of which provide imperfect meas-
res of the underlying social structure (Freeman and Romney,
987). Third, the target network of 15 individuals provides a larger
nd more challenging recall task than most other research in this
rea (e.g., De Soto, 1960; Freeman, 1992; Janicik and Larrick, 2005),
hich has relied on four-alter target networks. It is therefore more
ikely that any compression heuristics employed in managing real
ocial networks will come into play. Fourth, the target networks
lways contain two components, and contrast a condition where
he target network has closed triads with a condition where the
arget networks lack closed triads. This both makes group-based
ecall a feasible option, and allows us to discriminate between
 general tendency to encode networks in triads and a tendency
hat is situational based on the target. Fifth, these data contrast
 condition where all relations are described using kin terms
nd a condition where all relations are described using non-kin
erms. Kin relations function as a schema for network recall (e.g.,
rashears, 2013; Brewer and Yang, 1994) and are highly salient
ven among non-human primates (e.g., Cheney and Seyfarth, 2008;
heney et al., 1986). Therefore, the contrasting conditions allow
s to determine if, as we  might expect, the preferred encoding
trategy is partially conditioned on the activation of a kin schema.
inally, because data were collected from approximately 300
espondents, there is an unusually large amount of information on
hich to base conclusions.
Participants (197 female, 104 male) were recruited from among
he undergraduate population of a mid-sized northeastern univer-
ity in the United States using ﬂyers and other direct solicitations.
hese participants were randomized into one of four experimentalFig. 1. Reducible (Panel A) and irreducible (Panel B) network structures.
conditions with a minimum of 72 and a maximum of 78 partici-
pants per condition. All four conditions presented a vignette (i.e.,
paragraph of text) describing a network of relationships between
15 individuals (e.g., “Henry is Alyssa’s brother. Henry is also Eliz-
abeth’s son . . .”). Vignettes were used because (1) they permit
absolute control of the depicted network, (2) they allow the dyads
to be presented in context, and (3) humans routinely exchange
social information linguistically (e.g., gossip; see Dunbar, 2004).
The vignettes lacked any plot or story and both characters and
dyads were presented in the same order in all conditions. Each
vignette included a structural reducibility manipulation and a cul-
tural schema strength manipulation. A network was  reducible if it
contained triadic closure (Fig. 1a), while it was irreducible if it con-
tained no closed triads (Fig. 1b). A network had a strong cultural
schema if relations were described using kin labels (e.g., “Catherine
is Thomas’ mother”, “Catherine and Alyssa are sisters”), and it had a
weak cultural schema if the relations were described using non-kin
recreational labels (e.g., “Catherine is Thomas’ friend”, “Catherine
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nd Alyssa are members of a chorus”). Spouses were considered to
e kin because they are ﬁctive kin, because they often share genetic
elationships to shared children, and because they represent a
urable kin-like alliance. The structural reducibility manipulation
llows us to distinguish between an overall tendency to rely on
riadic encoding and a situational tendency. If triads are always
referred, for example, we should observe tendencies to recall
ies in triangles in both conditions. However, if encoding schemes
re selected based on the properties of the network that is to be
ecalled, then different methods should be used for the reducible
triadic) and irreducible (non-triadic) conditions. Thus, this manip-
lation allows us to explore whether encoding is ﬁxed, or ﬂexible.
he schema strength manipulation allows us to determine whether
he presence or absence of a kin schema, a highly salient method
f organizing relationships across species, inﬂuences which sub-
tructures are used for encoding networks. The two  manipulations,
educible versus irreducible and strong versus weak schema,
ere crossed to produce four conditions (i.e., Reducible/Strong,
educible/Weak, Irreducible/Strong, Irreducible/Weak). The net-
ork depicted in the vignette for a respondent’s condition is the
true” network for purposes of our analysis.
All conditions contained 15 nodes, but all reducible condi-
ions contained 46 reciprocated directed ties while all irreducible
onditions contained 26 reciprocated directed ties and no con-
ition contained unreciprocated ties. These constraints yielded
etwork densities (Wasserman and Faust, 1999) of 0.219 and 0.124,
espectively. Because the number of nodes was constant in all con-
itions and the speciﬁed constraints were imposed (e.g., triadic
losure), the reducible and irreducible conditions were forced to
ave unequal numbers of ties. The network size of 15 was cho-
en with the intention of stressing the participants; the number
f individuals depicted exceeds the estimated maximum capacity
f working memory by roughly a factor of two, and the potential
umber of relations (i.e., 210) is more than an order of magnitude
reater (Reisberg, 1997). All vignettes contained two disconnected
omponents (i.e., sub-groups with no connections between them),
nd the components did not vary in size by condition. The schema
trength manipulation only impacted the terms used to describe
he network and did not impact its structure. Thus, all conditions
ith the reducible (i.e., closed triad) manipulation depicted the tar-
et network presented in Fig. 1, Panel A, while all conditions with
he irreducible (i.e., open triad) manipulation depicted the target
etwork presented in Fig. 1, Panel B.
Participants began the experiment by sitting at a prepared com-
uter terminal and answering a series of simple demographic
uestions. The computer then chose a vignette at random and pre-
ented it as a paragraph of text on the screen. The participants were
nstructed to commit the information contained in the vignette
o memory. One vignette was presented to each participant and
ll participants who were in the same condition saw the same
ignette. Participants had unlimited time to study the vignette and
ere allowed to take notes on provided sheets of paper, but knew
hat the notes would be conﬁscated before the recall phase. The
mount of time spent studying the vignette was measured without
he participants’ knowledge.
Once the participant ﬁnished studying the vignette, they com-
leted a word span exercise (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980) with
he experimenter. The participant read a series of sentence sets out
oud and, at pre-determined times, recalled the last word in each
receding sentence in the current set. The number of sentences in
ach set gradually increased from a low of two to a high of seven,
nd three sets of a given number of sentences (e.g., three sets of
hree sentences, three sets of four sentences, etc.) were presented
n sequence before the next larger sets were encountered. The exer-
ise continued until the participant was unable to recall the ﬁnal
ords correctly for two out of three sets of a given size (e.g., two setsNetworks 41 (2015) 113–126 119
of six sentences out of three sets presented) or obtained the max-
imum score (i.e., 7+). A participant’s score was equal to the largest
set where they were successful at remembering two  out of three
sets at that length. In other words, if a subject remembered the ﬁnal
words for two out of three sets of ﬁve sentences, but only remem-
bered the ﬁnal words for one out of three sets of six sentences, their
word span score would be ﬁve. The sentences were drawn from
popular press books, ensuring a high degree of readability, and all
contained between 13 and 16 words, keeping the memory demands
of each sentence constant. This provides a conventional measure of
working memory capacity, and clears the participants’ working and
sensory (i.e., auditory and visual) memory stores. Because the word
span task required the subjects to speak the sentences out loud no
more than one participant was permitted in the lab at a time, so as to
prevent contamination of their scores. At the end of the word span
task the experimenter entered the participant’s score into the com-
puter terminal, and the participant used the terminal to complete
the remainder of the study.
In the recall phase participants checked a series of boxes to
indicate which characters had relationships with each other. On
a second screen the participants then indicated the type of rela-
tionship (e.g., spouse, friend) they believed characterized each tie
they identiﬁed in the preceding set of questions. Participants could
return to the ﬁrst part of the recall phase and change their selec-
tions as often as desired, but this cleared the relationship type
choices, and participants received no feedback on their answers.
Finally, participants were compensated and debriefed. All partic-
ipants were told that the amount of compensation they would
receive for completing the study was  contingent on their success at
recalling the vignette, but in fact all participants were compensated
equally. The deception ensured that the participants were moti-
vated to recall the information accurately. The experiment typically
required forty minutes to complete, and all participants completed
it. All procedures were approved by the IRB.
In contrast to Brashears (2013), who was only concerned with
overall accuracy of recall, we  analyze these data for consistent pat-
terns of recall in order to discover how networks are cognitively
represented. This means that we  must search the recalled networks
for particular sub-structures (i.e., dyads, triads, clusters) that are
recalled more often than would be expected by chance, controlling
for the target network structure. However, it is well understood
that network sub-structures are not independent of one another,
making standard statistical techniques inappropriate, and we adopt
exponential random graph models (explained in greater detail in
the next section) to compensate (see Lusher et al., 2013). Given that
these data contain the recalled networks from roughly 300 par-
ticipants, we  can adopt one of two aggregation strategies: either
we can estimate separate models for each participant and then
combine them using a meta analysis (somewhat analogous to
aggregating individual-level data in a regression), or we  can ana-
lyze the consensus networks provided in Brashears’ original paper
(2013: 5), thereby ﬁtting separate models to a smaller number
of already aggregated networks. Below we  explain the consensus
networks in more detail, and then discuss why we  prefer to present
the results from this approach rather than the meta analysis of
individual network models.
The consensus networks are produced by aggregating responses
across participants and a tie is considered to exist between two
nodes if a pre-speciﬁed proportion of the participants claimed
that it exists. For example, a consensus network with a thresh-
old of 0.80 would include a tie between two nodes if 80% or
more of the respondents claimed it exists, and would exclude
it otherwise. Similarly, a consensus network with a threshold of
0.10 would include a tie between two nodes if 10% or more of
the respondents claimed it exists, and so on. This aggregation is
equivalent to Krackhardt’s (1987) “consensus structures,” with the
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dents. These mistakes can be dyadic, triadic, or group-based and
therefore will signal how individuals are encoding social ties in
memory. Put differently, recall of the ties depicted in the vignette20 M.E. Brashears, E. Quintane / S
xception that we are aggregating participant recollections of a
arget network supplied by the researcher, rather than participant
ecollections of a natural network in which they participate. Eleven
onsensus networks were calculated for each condition at 100%,
0%, 80%, 70%, 60%, 50%, 40%, 30% 20%, 10% and 5% consensus, for
 total of 44 networks. Because the structure of the target network
s unaffected by the schema strength manipulation, and analyses
ndicate that the effects of this manipulation on our results are
egligible, we collapse the strong and weak schema conditions
ogether. In contrast, the reducible and irreducible conditions con-
ain structurally different target networks (see Fig. 1), and should
ot be aggregated even in principle. Aggregating the strong and
eak cultural schemas reduces the set of consensus networks to 22
ather than 44. Because the consensus networks are produced by
ggregating across respondents from data collected in a random-
zed laboratory study they cannot be explained using participant
haracteristics (e.g., race, sex, etc.).
Both a meta analysis of individual networks and an analysis of
he consensus networks represent methods of data aggregation. In
he former, the data are left fully disaggregated and we  combine
arameters to produce a single set of results for each condition. In
he latter, the data are aggregated in a number of networks and we
stimate a separate set of parameters for each set of networks in
ach condition. Both approaches produce consistent results (see the
ection on robustness checks), but we prefer to present the results
ased on the consensus networks. The main reason is that using a
onsensus approach enables us to vary the level of consensus for
ach condition, which we could not do if we were to analyze the
etworks at the individual level. Varying the level of consensus is
mportant because it provides insights into respondents’ system-
tic errors at different levels of certainty, as a group. For example,
orrect ties that appear at higher levels of consensus are those about
hich participants, as a group, are quite certain. By contrast, those
hat appear at lower levels of consensus are those about which par-
icipants are more uncertain. Similarly, errors that appear at low
evels of consensus only are relatively uncommon, while those that
ppear at comparatively higher levels of consensus are the most
ppealing or cognitively accessible mistakes. The same is true of
tructural features; parameters that are signiﬁcant at higher levels
f consensus reﬂect stronger tendencies, than those appearing at
ower levels of consensus. Furthermore, because respondent recall
f the target networks is in general quite good (see Brashears, 2013),
esults deriving from the meta analysis approach would be domi-
ated by accurate recall. Thus, while both methods produce similar
esults, we prefer the approach based on consensus networks for
he additional detail it provides.
.2. Analytic method
We  use Exponential Random Graph Modeling (ERGM or p*
odeling) to examine the structure of the consensus networks
see Lusher et al., 2013). ERGMs allow the examination of micro-
tructural patterns that constitute a network structure and hence
rovide inferences about the processes that brought that speciﬁc
tructure to existence. ERGMs are tie-based models speciﬁcally
esigned to account for the dependencies between observations
hat characterize network data (Lusher et al., 2013). The depend-
nt variable is the presence or absence of a tie between two actors
s a function of the local structure of the network surrounding
he two actors. ERGMs are based on the assumption that network
tructure is locally emergent, and hence that the repetition of local
icrostructures deﬁnes the general structural patterns observedn an empirical network. In our case, it means that the occurrence
or non-occurrence) of a speciﬁc microstructure in the consen-
us networks would be indicative of processes common to our
espondents when recalling the target network. Because these localNetworks 41 (2015) 113–126
microstructures are not independent from each other (i.e., a dyad
is embedded in a triad, which is itself embedded in a group struc-
ture), we  need to be able to model the microstructures of interest
together and assess the extent to which each of them participates
in the processes that gave rise to the structure of the network.
The models are autologistic and commonly expressed under the
form:
Pr(X = x) e[˙AZA(x)]
K
(1)
where x is the observed network; A is the parameter corresponding
to a local network conﬁguration; A are the parameter estimates;
ZA(x) is the network statistic counting the frequency of subgraph
A in the graph x; K is a normalizing quantity to ensure that the
probability is a proper probability distribution (see Robins et al.,
2009).
We  use the PNet software package for undirected graphs (Wang
et al., 2006) and include a set of predictors that enable us to distin-
guish the social processes prevalent in the consensus networks at
the dyadic, triadic and cluster levels (see Table 1).
For our ﬁrst hypothesis, at the dyadic level, we include an Edge
term, which reﬂects the propensity for actors to recall the ties in
the network as isolated dyads. A positive and signiﬁcant parame-
ter estimate would indicate that dyads tend to occur on their own,
which would be consistent with a process of encoding focused on
dyads and would conﬁrm our ﬁrst hypothesis. In order to address
our group level hypotheses, we  include higher order parameters for
Closure and Connectivity ( Robins et al., 2006; Snijders et al., 2006).
Higher order parameters provide information about the extent
to which a speciﬁc dyad is recalled within a conﬁguration that
includes multiple shared partners (i.e., clusters or groups). They are
based on the assumption that a respondent’s recall of a tie between
actor A and actor B is dependent not only on the existence of one
third party C who  is tied to both A and B, but of k partners that
are tied to both A and B. Higher order parameters reﬂect a pro-
cess of structural embeddedness that is consistent with the broad
group distinction that we present in our hypothesis. For our third
hypothesis, at the triadic level, we  include a Markov parameter (Tri-
angle) that captures the extent to which ties are recalled within
triadic conﬁgurations, but do not require the presence of multi-
ple partners, hence distinguishing between the triad and a broader
group.
Further, we  control for the degree distribution in the consen-
sus networks in order to assess the extent to which the observed
structure is due to a degree-based mechanism (e.g., preferential
attachment). Finally, we ﬁx the ties that are present in the target
network when modeling the consensus networks (using structural
zeros3). Effectively, it means that we  estimate the likelihood of a tie
being recalled by the participants outside of the network that par-
ticipants are asked to recall. We  model the structure that remains
in the consensus network once the target network is taken into
account. The analysis therefore provides us with information as
to whether the recall errors of the respondents follow speciﬁc
patterns or not. This is essential because we should expect the
recalled networks to approximate the target networks more or
less closely. As a result, the organizing principles of network recall
will be revealed in the types of mistakes made by our respon-3 Our results are robust to different speciﬁcations of the ERGM regarding the con-
trol for the target networks. We also estimated models using the target networks as
dyadic covariates and obtained substantively similar results. We present the models
using structural zeros because they represent a more conservative control for the
structural features of the target network.
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Table  1
Effects included in the exponential random graph models.
Name Visual representation Description
Edge The propensity for a tie to be present (when no other effect is included)
Triangles The propensity for ties to form as part of triangles
Closure The propensity for ties to form as part of a multiple closure conﬁgurations
Multiple connectivity The propensity for ties to form as part of formations involving multiple short paths between actors
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ells us little about how networks are stored in memory because
he researcher determines the structure of the vignette network.
n contrast, the extra ties recalled by respondents, but not pre-
ented in the vignette (i.e., false positives), provide information
bout how humans encode networks. If networks are encoded as
yads, then individual erroneous ties should appear independent
f other structures. If networks are encoded as triads, then erro-
eous ties should tend to be recalled in triangles. And if networks
re encoded as groups, then erroneous ties should tend to appear
n the higher order structures we speciﬁed. Thus the patterning of
ecall net of the correct answers allows us to infer how networks
re encoded into memory.
. Results
Before entering into the ERGM analysis, we  assess the extent
f overlap between the consensus and the target networks and
rovide some basic descriptive statistics of the networks that we
odel. We  ﬁnd that at levels of consensus at or above 20% (i.e.,
0% or more respondents agree that each tie exists), the overlap
etween the target and the consensus networks is greater than 90%,
ith typically only one tie deviating between the two  networks.
ubstantively, this means that, as a group, respondents have a very
ccurate recall of the target network. Methodologically, this inﬂu-
nces our use of the higher level consensus networks. Because we
x the ties of the target network in the consensus networks dur-
ng the ERGM analysis, the results provide information about the
tructural patterns that deviate from accurate recall. Networks with
 consensus at or above 20% are (almost) completely aligned with
he target network and their analysis brings no information. We
herefore discard them and focus the analysis on the networks with
onsensus 5% and 10% for the reducible and irreducible conditions.
Table 2 presents some basic network statistics regarding the
onsensus networks. The 5% consensus networks in the reducible
nd irreducible conditions are similarly dense, clustered and cen-
ralized. By contrast the 10% consensus networks in the reducible
nd irreducible conditions differ more substantially. The 10%
onsensus reducible network is denser, more clustered and less
entralized than its irreducible counterpart. We were not expect-
ng the two networks to be similar, because the target networks
hemselves have a different structure. However, we make note of
hese issues because of the potential for the density differential
o affect our results (see below). Furthermore, respondents cor-
ectly recalled all ties from the target networks in the 5% and 10% dispersion in the degree distribution
consensus networks (0 false negative). The number of false posi-
tives differs between the two  consensus levels, with a shaper
reduction of the number of false positives at the 10% level relative to
the 5% level in the irreducible condition (approximately divided by
2 in the reducible condition and by 4 in the irreducible condition).
Table 3 presents four models, two for each condition (reducible
and irreducible). We  will ﬁrst describe each model separately and
then identify common trends that can provide insights into respon-
dents’ patterns of recall. Model 1 corresponds to a 5% consensus for
the reducible condition. The only signiﬁcant effect is at the triadic
level, with a positive and signiﬁcant triangle effect. In this net-
work, triangles are more likely to be recalled than what would be
expected by chance alone, taking into account the target network.
In Model 2, which corresponds to a 10% consensus network in the
reducible condition, we still see a signiﬁcant and positive triangle
effect. There is also a negative and signiﬁcant degree distribution
parameter, indicating that the degree distribution in the consen-
sus network is more homogenous than what would be expected by
chance.
Models 3 and 4 represent the irreducible condition networks
with a consensus level of 5% and 10%, respectively. In Model 3,
the edge parameter is signiﬁcant and negative. Because the edge
parameter is included in a model with several other parameters,
the interpretation of a negative and signiﬁcant effect is that ties do
not tend to be recalled on their own; rather they are part of the
structures identiﬁed in the model (Lusher et al., 2013). The triangle
effect is signiﬁcant and positive. Triangles are recalled more than
expected by chance and taking into account the target network.
The multiple connectivity parameter is signiﬁcant and positive. The
recalled networks tend to be composed of actors that are linked
to multiple shared partners, even though the actors are not nec-
essarily linked themselves. This tendency is above what could be
expected by chance, when taking the target network into consider-
ation. The degree distribution parameter is signiﬁcant and negative.
In Model 4, the edge parameter is signiﬁcant and negative. The
triangle parameter is non-signiﬁcant. The closure parameter is sig-
niﬁcant and positive, while the multiple connectivity parameter is
non-signiﬁcant and negative. Hence, the recalled networks exhibit
more dyads that are connected to multiple shared partners than
what would be expected by chance, when taking the target network
into consideration.
In summary, the dyadic level parameter is either non-signiﬁcant
and negative for reducible networks or signiﬁcant and negative for
irreducible networks, which indicates that dyads tend not to be
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics reducible and irreducible consensus networks.
Reducible 5% Reducible 10% Irreducible 5% Irreducible 10%
Number of nodes 15 15 15 15
Number of edges (density) 148 (0.70) 102 (0.48) 146 (0.69) 58 (0.28)
Number of triangles (clustering) 1062 (53%) 504 (58%) 1032 (51%) 114 (32%)
Centralization 34% 18% 35% 34%
Number of ties in the target network 44 44 26 26
Number of ties correctly recalled 44 44 26 26
Number of false positives 104 58 120 32
Number of false negatives 0 0 0 0
Table 3
ERG models for undirected consensus networks, reducible and irreducible conditions.
Model 1
Reducible 5%
Model 2
Reducible 10%
Model 3
Irreducible 5%
Model 4
Irreducible 10%
Dyadic level
Edge −6.017
(5.979)
−6.241
(3.247)
−6.493*
(2.218)
−6.046*
(2.356)
Triadic level
Triangles 3.504*
(1.233)
1.189*
(0.518)
1.750*
(0.517)
−2.102
(2.017)
Group level
Closure 0.212
(3.325)
1.980
(1.149)
Not included 3.603*
(1.549)
Multiple Connectivity 6.694*
(3.326)
0.331
(0.288)
4.063*
(1.724)
−0.108
(0.453)
Controls
Degree distribution −0.245*
(0.114)
−.0109*
(0.036)
−0.079*
(0.034)
−0.006
(0.116)
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* Signiﬁcant at p < .05.
ecalled on their own. This result contradicts our Dyadic Recall
ypothesis, which was that recall would tend to occur through
irect encoding of dyads. The triadic level parameter is signiﬁcant
nd positive for the reducible networks and for one of the two
rreducible networks. Our Triadic Recall hypothesis is therefore
ainly supported; respondents exhibit a tendency to use triads
o encode network information. Finally, group level parameters
re signiﬁcant and positive for the irreducible networks and non-
igniﬁcant for the reducible networks. The Group Recall hypothesis
s partially supported; respondents exhibit a tendency to use
roader group structures to encode network information for one
f the two conditions.4
. Substantive interpretation
Our main result is that respondents use both triad level and
roup level mechanisms to encode the target networks, but not a
yad level mechanism. This result provides evidence that respon-
ents encode compressed social information in order to make recall
ore cognitively tractable. Respondents do not remember a net-
ork tie by tie, but rather use more complex relational schema,
uch as triads or small group structures in order to remember social
etwork information.
Yet, there is an interesting nuance in this ﬁnding, which is that
he relational schema condition (reducible or irreducible) affected
he encoding mechanism used by respondents. Encoding in the
educible condition is solely based on triad level mechanisms with
4 Note that the density differential between the 10% consensus reducible and
rreducible networks is unlikely to explain our results. Given that the 10% reducible
etwork is denser (and more clustered) than the 10% irreducible consensus network
e  might have expected the group level parameters to be more salient in the 10%
onsensus reducible network, but this is not the case.no group level parameter being signiﬁcant. By contrast, in the
irreducible condition, both triad level and group level parameters
are signiﬁcant. Because we model the deviation of the consensus
networks from the target networks, our results should be inter-
preted as the mechanisms that characterize regular patterns of
mistakes that individuals make in remembering the target network.
Hence, for reducible networks, respondents tend to consistently
identify more triads than those that were present in the target net-
work. Because this tendency is above and beyond what could be
expected by chance, we can infer that the result indicates a sys-
tematic tendency of participants to erroneously recall triads (and
hence to use triads as a mechanism to commit the network infor-
mation to memory). By contrast, for irreducible networks, group
level parameters are signiﬁcant. This means that respondents tend
to consistently recall more group-like structures than those that
exist in the target irreducible network in addition to triads.
This result suggests that because different structural features
(triadic and group) are predominant in reducible and irreducible
conditions, individuals tend to adapt the encoding mechanisms
that they use based on the most appropriate, recognizable
relational schema. The only difference between reducible and
irreducible conditions is the extent to which the target networks
exhibit triadic closure. In the consensus networks for the reducible
condition, respondents accurately identify the existence of triads
and use triadic structures to encode the information of the whole
networks. By contrast, for the irreducible condition, respondents
sometimes, and somewhat uncertainly, focus on triads, but also
revert to broader recall categories represented by the group level
parameters. Here, respondents tend to identify that individuals are
part of a more general connective structure (i.e., a group) that is not
speciﬁcally recognized as a triad. This tendency for individuals to
adapt the recall mechanisms that they use can in turn be conceived
as a demonstration of cognitive ﬂexibility in the way in which social
information is encoded in the respondents’ memory.
ocial 
l
r
w
l
b
a
f
d
i
(
d
a
r
f
r
t
b
t
s
a
t
W
o
m
t
i
t
p
s
i
m
n
7
o
i
a
t
S
i
s
p
s
s
ﬁ
p
o
c
W
b
T
i
r
t
o
e
h
p
u
a
ﬁ
human social networks in particular.
Triads appear to be the default structure of human network
recall, but they are not the only structure for recall. When the net-
work to be recalled contained no triads our subjects seemed to
5 It is additionally interesting that in the irreducible consensus networks, where
both triadic compression and group-based encoding are attempted by our respon-M.E. Brashears, E. Quintane / S
A further interesting nuance emerges when considering the
evel of consensus in the irreducible networks. Consensus rep-
esents the degree of agreement between respondents regarding
hether a given tie exists in the target network or not. The lower
evel of consensus represents a lower threshold of agreement
etween the respondents for each tie to exist. At 5% consensus,
t least 5% of respondents (approximately 7 participants out of 148
or the reducible condition and 8 out of 153 for the irreducible con-
ition) needed to agree that a given tie existed for it to be present
n the consensus network. At 10% of consensus, 10% of respondents
approximately 15 participants out of 148 for the reducible con-
ition and 15 out of 153 for the irreducible condition) needed to
gree that the tie existed. At the higher level of consensus more
espondents agree that a given tie should exist and the structural
eatures exhibited by the consensus network should therefore rep-
esent more deﬁned relational schemas. Given this, it is interesting
hat for the lower consensus network in the irreducible condition,
oth the triad and group level parameters are signiﬁcant, but for
he higher level of consensus, only the group level parameter is
igniﬁcant. We  interpret this result as an indication that the mech-
nism that is most consistent with an absence of information about
riadic structures in a social network is a group level mechanism.
hen individuals have limited information about the existence
f triads in a network, they will tend to encode the social infor-
ation as broader groups. The existence of a triad parameter in
he lower level of consensus for the irreducible condition may  be
nterpreted as a weak tendency for respondents to attempt to use
riads as a way to encode the social information even if it is not
resent in the network to be recalled. These interpretations could
uggest that the triadic level is the default level of encoding of social
nformation and that humans can ﬂexibility select other encoding
echanisms based on the amount of information contained in the
etwork.
. Robustness checks
While not presented here in order to save space, we  carried
ut three robustness checks. First, while the vignettes included
n Brashears’ (2013) experiment did not include sufﬁcient detail
bout the characters to provide an alternative schema for encoding,
here was one potential schema that could not be eliminated: sex.
ince the sex of each character could be inferred from their name,
t is possible that subjects would preferentially (mis)remember
ex-homogeneous (or heterogeneous) dyads. This is a key issue as
revious research among non-human primates has identiﬁed con-
iderable differences in how the networks of males and females are
tructured (see Cheney and Seyfarth, 2008: Ch. 4 and 5). However,
tting ERGMs that include a sex homophily parameter indicates no
articular tendency to remember these dyads more readily than
thers. Sex-based encoding is thus not an issue.
Second, it is possible that our results might depend idiosyn-
ratically on the speciﬁc levels of consensus that we examined.
e therefore estimated models at levels of consensus increasing
y one percentage point from 5% to 15% (e.g., 6%, 7%, 8%, etc.).
hese models indicate that triads are consistently and robustly
dentiﬁed by respondents in the reducible condition across a wide
ange of consensus values. In contrast, in the irreducible condi-
ions, triads are identiﬁed somewhat inconsistently at lower levels
f consensus while the closure and multiple-connectively param-
ters (i.e., group-level parameters) emerge most consistently at
igher levels of consensus. While one should be cautious in inter-
reting these models because differences in rounding may  play an
nreasonably large role in distinguishing consensus networks sep-
rated by one percentage point, these results are supportive of our
ndings. When the network contains triadic closure, respondentsNetworks 41 (2015) 113–126 123
robustly take advantage of triadic-based encoding methods. How-
ever, when the network contains no triads, respondents exhibit a
substantially weakened, though non-zero, tendency to adopt tri-
adic encoding methods, and develop a new afﬁnity for group-based
recall.5 It therefore does not appear that our ﬁndings are uniquely
dependent on the speciﬁc levels of consensus we  chose as our
focus.
Third, we conducted a meta analysis of results from ERGMs ﬁt
to the individual networks (see our earlier discussion at the end of
the Data section). We  ﬁtted four different ERGMs to each individ-
ual network, all of which included a control for degree distribution
(3 star) as well as a control for the target network. The ﬁrst model
included only an edge term, the second model an edge term and
a triangle term, the third model an edge term and a multiple clo-
sure term and the fourth model an edge term, a triangle term and
a multiple closure term. If the full model converged, we  saved the
sign and signiﬁcance of the edge, triangle and closure parameters.
If the full model did not converge, then we saved the sign and sig-
niﬁcance of the parameters of the model with the best goodness of
ﬁt. Because of a generally high level of respondent accuracy, many
models did not converge (out of 301 models, 111 converged for
the reducible condition and 109 for the irreducible condition). We
then counted the number of times that edges, triangle and multi-
ple closure parameters were positive or negative and signiﬁcant for
each condition. There results are striking in their agreement with
our analysis of the consensus networks. The edge term is always
negative and signiﬁcant. There are 32 models with a positive and
signiﬁcant triangle term in the reducible condition versus 4 in the
irreducible network condition. There are 15 positive and 9 negative
multiple closure terms in the irreducible condition versus 6 posi-
tive and 24 negative in the reducible condition. Consistent with
our main results, the analysis of individual networks also empha-
sizes the importance of triangles for the reducible condition and
the importance of group like structures for the irreducible condi-
tion. Therefore, while we prefer to present the consensus results in
detail, both approaches yield the same conclusions.
8. Discussion and conclusions
Our results indicate that humans exhibit a tendency to recall
social networks in terms of triads, possibly even when the network
they are attempting to recall is non-triadic (i.e., the irreducible
network). In contrast, we  never observed a tendency for respon-
dents to encode relations as individual dyads, and only sometimes
observed tendencies towards group-based recall. This suggests that
when people attempt to recall networks they attend primarily to
triads and we  take this as evidence that the triad is the basic unit
of network recall. This ﬁnding supports our Triad Recall Hypothe-
sis, and is consistent with previous scholarly interest in triads (e.g.,
Burt, 1992; Chase et al., 2002; Granovetter, 1973; Paz-y-Min˜o-C
et al., 2004; Skvoretz et al., 1996), suggesting that these features
are not just convenient for theoretical or modeling purposes, but
really are a fundamental unit of social networks generally, and ofdents, the group-based encoding mechanism, which is the most correct of the two,
appears only at higher levels of consensus. While not direct proof, this is consistent
with our argument that encoding is done using pre-set mechanisms such as triads
or groups and that humans “choose” which mechanism best ﬁts the structure that
they  are attempting to memorize and recall.
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ecognize this fact and activated an alternative group-based encod-
ng scheme in response. This indicates that even if the triad is the
efault unit of network recall, individuals are nevertheless able to
verride this default when alternatives are more appropriate. This
nding is consistent with prior research, largely on the elicitation of
ames, which shows that humans can encode and recall alters ﬂex-
bly using a number of schemata (e.g., Brewer and Garrett, 2001;
rewer and Yang, 1994; Killworth and Bernard, 1982), though of
ourse the recall of names is quite different from the recall of sub-
tructures. It is clear that humans exhibit considerable cognitive
exibility where networks are concerned, but it is less clear why
his ﬂexibility exists. A deﬁnitive explanation is beyond the scope
f our research, but we suspect that three phenomena are to blame:
diosyncratic deviations, variations in tie strength, and information
eﬁcits.
Beginning with idiosyncratic deviations, it is clear that compres-
ion heuristics are valuable for reducing the cognitive burden of
ecalling large networks, but they are only useful if they match the
etwork to be recalled. When a network does not exhibit triadic
losure, adopting the triad as the basic unit of recall is unlikely
o be beneﬁcial (e.g., Brashears, 2013). But even if a network has
any triangles, it is unlikely to be perfectly triadic. Applying a tri-
dic schema by rote, with no ability to adjust for deviations, would
mpair network recall. And because unclosed triads may  represent
ridging opportunities to be exploited (e.g., Burt, 1992), or danger-
us conﬂicts to be avoided, failure to recognize them might exert a
isproportionate effect on the individual.
Second, it is well understood that some ties are stronger
han others. A number of features deﬁne the strength of a tie
Granovetter, 1973) and the importance of these features varies
epending on the outcome of interest (e.g., Aral and Van Alstyne,
011), but stronger ties are generally thought to involve greater
mounts of interpersonal knowledge and may  require more
aintenance than weaker ties. This implies that recalling these
elationships purely through the use of compression heuristics is
nwise, both because of the richer history imbuing the tie, and
ecause of the greater penalties for recall errors. We  might there-
ore expect triads to be the basis of recall for weaker ties, while
yadic recall dominates for strong ties.
Third, individual humans rarely possess perfect knowledge of all
etworks that they interact with. When only a handful of the ties
n a given network are known the individual may adopt a group-
ased encoding scheme because it ﬁts with their perceptions. Thus,
e might expect humans to use non-triadic encoding for networks
bout which they have little information and to use triadic encod-
ng for networks that they know in detail. Obviously this implies
hat humans should shift from group-level to triadic encoding as
hey become socialized into a new group and learn its structure.
ut less obviously, it suggests that humans may  be prone to use tri-
dic encoding for in-groups, about which they know a great deal,
nd to use group-level encoding for out-groups, about which they
now considerably less (see also Kumbasar et al., 1994). As a result
ut-groups may  often be perceived as monolithic, composed of uni-
ed “others” who have homogeneous opinions and relations, while
ne’s own group will be perceived as containing diversity, nuance
nd disagreement. As such, the ﬂexible application of compression
euristics to social networks may  encourage the perception of out-
roups as fundamentally different, and possibly more threatening,
han in-groups.
Our apparent cognitive ﬂexibility is advantageous, but also rep-
esents unique challenges for network analysis. We  began this
nvestigation by observing that the types of macro-scale networks
hat humans create will be shaped by the micro-structures that
hey use for network recall. This perspective is consistent with
ur ﬁndings, but is complicated by the fact that humans select
heir encoding method based on the characteristics of the targetNetworks 41 (2015) 113–126
network. This suggests that there may be a network structural
“Matthew Effect,” such that the initial conﬁguration of a network
shapes how individuals encode it, which guides their behavior and
thereby guides the ultimate conﬁguration of the network. This
implies that it may  be possible to shape the evolution of networks
by strategically priming particular schemas. Thus, it might be possi-
ble to use an individual-level intervention to improve the cohesion
or social capital of a network. Finally, many highly inﬂuential net-
work studies are based on respondent recall of their networks, and
our results indicate that the nature of the encoding bias changes
depending on the characteristics of the true network. Determining
the properties of a true network from respondent recall will there-
fore require cautious exploration of the biases that are present (e.g.,
Feld and Carter, 2002), and use of this information to estimate the
nature of the underlying network.
Future studies would beneﬁt from using EEG or fMRI methods to
chart the activity in the brain during various stages of the learning,
encoding, and recall processes. However, it should be kept in mind
that an fMRI may  be able to tell the researcher that network encod-
ing takes place in a particular part of the brain (e.g., the ventral
medial prefrontal cortex) but cannot reveal what the brain is doing.
Knowing that a program is executed by the CPU in a computer is
different from knowing what the program is doing and, likewise,
knowing that encoding occurs in a speciﬁc part of the human brain
is different from knowing what the encoding is and how it works.
Future research should attempt to measure recall for artiﬁ-
cially generated networks in which the respondent participates
as this may  increase the motivation to accurately track network
information (although our deception should have compensated to
some degree). However, this will require constructing a number
of networks from scratch using confederates and thus will require
considerable planning to execute without an unreasonable number
of potential confounds.
Finally, a larger number of target network structures should be
evaluated so as to uncover any additional encoding schemas that
may exist. We  found evidence that triads are frequently used, and
that individuals can invoke a group-based encoding scheme, but
there may  be other encoding schemas in routine use. Uncover-
ing these additional schemas, if they exist, cannot help but add to
our understanding of how, and why, networks take on particular
structures.
Ultimately work in this vein will hopefully improve the causal
justiﬁcations for many network theories. It is tempting to explain
the regularities of human social life by making reference to what
individuals “prefer” or “like” (e.g., humans ﬁnd affectively balanced
relations to be “pleasant”). Yet, as pointed out by Mayhew (1980,
1981), such justiﬁcations boil down to a claim that people do cer-
tain things because they want to. This is a personally satisfying idea,
but it is fundamentally at odds with the goal of predictive social
science. The current line of work argues that some network struc-
tures are “liked” or “preferred” because they lower the information
processing requirements on the organism. As such, it helps to root
our network theory not in the ephemera of taste, but in the solid
bedrock of capacity and cost.
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